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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE


# Intelligence Memorandum

*Shipping to North Vietnam During September 1967*

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October 1967



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Foreword

The data in this memorandum are preliminary and subject to modification as additional information becomes available. Significant changes may occur in data on ship arrivals and cargoes from Communist China and, to a lesser extent, in data on cargoes carried by ships of the Free World. Data on Soviet and Eastern European ship arrivals and cargoes and on Free World arrivals are not likely to be changed significantly. To reflect these changes a table showing monthly arrivals, by flag, is included in this memorandum. All data on cargoes carried are expressed in metric tons.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Foreign Shipping to North Vietnam  
During September 1967

Summary

The number of foreign ships calling at North Vietnam and the volume of identified imports in September were well below the monthly averages for the first eight months of 1967, and exports fell to a record low volume.\* Although the ports and storage areas of Haiphong are still congested, the reduced level of shipping activity facilitated a significant reduction in layover times for dry cargo ships calling at Haiphong.

Ship arrivals in September totaled 25, two more than in August, and 18 of these arrivals were Communist, as shown in Figure 1 and the following tabulation:

*\* For details on ship arrivals as well as identified imports and exports carried on foreign-flag ships, see Tables 1 through 4.*

*Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research; the estimates and conclusions represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of October 1967.*

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Flag	Monthly Averages <sup>a/</sup>			
	September	1st Qtr. '67	2nd Qtr. '67	3rd Qtr. '67
Total	<u>25</u>	<u>40.3</u>	<u>37.0</u>	<u>23.3</u>
Communist countries	<u>18</u>	<u>35.7</u>	<u>28.7</u>	<u>17.3</u>
USSR	8	21.0	14.7	10.0
Eastern Europe	2	3.7	3.3	1.7
Communist China	8	11.0	10.3	5.7
Cuba	0	0	0.3	0
Free World	<u>7</u>	<u>4.7</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>6.0</u>
United Kingdom	6	4.0	6.7	5.0
Other	1	0.7	1.7	1.0

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

Identified imports totaled 72,700 tons, 39 percent less than the average monthly volume for the first eight months of 1967. This reflects a sharp decline in imports on Soviet ships. Imports of petroleum and fertilizer dropped to a record low level for 1967. No seaborne imports of arms or ammunition were detected.

The volume of exports from North Vietnam fell to 10,600 tons, the lowest level since the US bombing program began early in 1965. Coal exports fell to 9,300 tons -- a new low. Coal exports from the much-bombed port of Cam Pha were limited to a single shipment of 1,100 tons, compared with average monthly exports of 33,600 tons during the first eight months of 1967. At least three ships that were in North Vietnam during September with the apparent intention of loading coal departed in ballast, a likely reflection of depleted coal stockpiles and the bomb damage inflicted on coal-processing facilities in both Cam Pha and Hon Gay.


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Figure 1

## North Vietnam: Foreign Ship Arrivals



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The Situation in Haiphong

1. The sharp decline in ship arrivals during the third quarter of 1967 resulted in an average of 21 days in port for those dry cargo ships that departed from Haiphong in September, compared with a monthly peak in August of 33 days and an average of 12 days in the first quarter of this year. Ships carrying flour and other foodstuffs had the shortest layover times -- averaging about 13 days in port -- while ships with fertilizer and miscellaneous and general cargoes averaged 32 days.

2. Storage areas in and around the port remain congested with cargoes, probably because the area is considered a safe depot protected by proximity to foreign ships and populated areas. Also at the end of September, the North Vietnamese were limited in their ability to move goods out of the port because of the interdiction of rail facilities at the port.

3. Silting appears to be increasing at Haiphong but has not yet become critical. Ships with drafts up to 26 feet can still enter the harbor (see Figure 2). Occasionally, ships have arrived with deeper drafts and have had to offload part of their cargoes before entering the harbor. Soviet ships from the Black Sea, however, have generally met the problem by carrying less cargo to Haiphong. North Vietnam has been seeking additional dredges to cope with silting.

Free World Shipping

4. Seven Free World freighters called at North Vietnam in September and delivered 21 percent of all identified seaborne imports. Six were Hong Kong-owned British-flag ships. Four of these British-flag ships were under Chinese time charter and delivered bulk food and general cargo from China; the other two were under North Vietnamese time charter, one delivering fertilizer from North Vietnam and one arriving in ballast from Hong Kong. An Italian ship, also operating under time charter to North Vietnam, delivered a small amount of fertilizer and general cargo from North Korea.

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Eight Free World ships, all in ballast, departed from North Vietnam -- six en route to China, one to Hong Kong, and one to Japan.

Communist Shipping

5. Eight Soviet ships arrived in September, compared with a monthly average of 16 during the first eight months of 1967. These eight ships carried 21,800 tons of cargo to North Vietnam, the lowest amount since November 1966 and 39,500 tons less than the average for the first eight months of 1967. Five Soviet ships arrived from the Soviet Far East -- two with flour; one with bulk petroleum; one, the large-hatch ship *Omsk*, with an unidentified cargo of large dimensions; and one in ballast (see Figure 3). The *Omsk* was light loaded and almost certainly carried a high-priority cargo. The protrusion of one or more tarpaulin-covered objects through the opening of the ship's large hatch (which would normally be closed by a metal hatch cover while at sea) indicates that the object (or objects) was more than 40 feet high, if loaded on the bottom of the hold, or almost 20 feet, if loaded between decks. There has been speculation that the *Omsk* carried *Komar*-class guided missile patrol boats. *Komars*, however, could not fit into the main hold without alteration in the structure of the *Omsk*. Nine Soviet ships -- eight dry cargo ships and one tanker -- departed from North Vietnam in September.


6. All eight of the Chinese Communist ships that arrived in North Vietnam during September came directly from China. Three ships carried rice, four carried general cargo, and one arrived in ballast (at Hon Gay) to load coal. The number of arrivals was greater than in either July or August, but below the monthly average of 11 during the first six months of 1967. Six Chinese ships departed from North Vietnam in September. Five sailed for China -- two with coal, one with general cargo, and two in ballast; the sixth, a Chinese-flag ship under Chipolbrok\* charter, loaded general cargo for Eastern and Western European ports.

\* *The Chinese-Polish Shipbrokers Corporation.*

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## NORTH VIETNAM: Maritime Ports, Anchorages, and Shipping Channels



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7. Two Eastern European ships, both Polish,\* called at North Vietnam in September. One delivered general cargo from several Eastern European countries and Belgium; the other delivered metals, chemicals, and vehicles from Eastern Europe. One Chipolbrok-chartered Polish-flag ship departed from North Vietnam in ballast for China.\*\* September 1967 was the first month since the US bombing of North Vietnam began in which no Eastern European ships departed from North Vietnam with export cargoes.

#### Cargoes

8. Identified seaborne imports to North Vietnam in September aboard foreign ships totaled 72,700 tons, significantly less than the 118,600 tons monthly average during the first eight months of 1967. Imports of petroleum and fertilizer showed the largest declines. No deliveries of arms or ammunition were detected.

9. Seaborne imports of petroleum fell from 22,600 tons in August to 5,500 tons in September -- all of it from the USSR. Imports of petroleum from the USSR had averaged about 17,000 tons monthly during the first eight months of 1967. The Soviet tanker *Araks* delivered 4,000 tons from the Soviet Far East and apparently transferred most of its cargo into a larger Soviet tanker, the *Molodechno*\*\*\*. A Soviet dry cargo ship delivered about 1,500 tons of packaged petroleum products from the Black Sea. There were no imports of petroleum from China in September. These imports had averaged 5,300 tons

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\* One was assigned to Polish Ocean Lines' liner service between Europe and the Far East; the other was a Chipolbrok ship.

\*\* Not the same Chipolbrok Polish ship listed among the arrivals.

\*\*\* The *Molodechno*, which arrived in August from Vladivostok, had apparently been discharging its cargo at a slow rate because of the inability of the North Vietnamese to store it or transport it out of the Haiphong area at a faster rate (see Figure 4). Because the *Molodechno* had capacity available when the *Araks* arrived, it became expedient to transfer its cargo to the *Molodechno*, thereby freeing the *Araks* for service elsewhere.

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monthly during the first eight months of 1967. The estimated level of petroleum supplies and the slow discharge rate for tankers in North Vietnam during September suggest that there was very little unused storage capacity available. The low level of imports during the month was probably intended to relieve this tight storage situation.

10. During September, fertilizer deliveries to North Vietnam consisted of two shipments from North Korea totaling 2,000 tons, the lowest level of deliveries since US bombing began early in 1965.

11. Deliveries of identified miscellaneous and general cargoes in September totaled 36,400 tons, close to the volume of August but somewhat less than the monthly average of 41,900 tons during the first eight months of 1967. General cargo from the USSR totaled 8,700 tons, well below the monthly average of 16,800 tons during the first eight months of 1967, and included metal products, construction materials, and industrial equipment. The volume of general cargo from Communist China rose from 6,600 tons in August to 14,600 tons in September, more than twice the average monthly volume during the first eight months of 1967. Except for some railroad freight cars, these general cargoes were not further identified. The volume of general cargo from Eastern Europe was 10,300 tons, slightly higher than average monthly deliveries during the first eight months of 1967.

12. Seaborne imports of foodstuffs totaled 28,800 tons, slightly more than in August, but about 7,500 tons less than the monthly average for the first eight months of 1967. These foodstuffs included 6,500 tons of flour from the Soviet Far East and 10,300 tons of rice, 9,100 tons of maize, and 2,800 tons of potatoes from China.

13. The volume of identified seaborne exports fell from 20,500 tons in August to 10,600 tons in September, a new monthly low for the period since early 1965. Exports of coal fell from 16,300 tons in August to 9,300 tons in September, the lowest volume since US bombings began. Coal exports from Cam Pha, which had averaged 33,600 tons a month during the first eight months of 1967, dropped to

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



Figure 3. The Soviet Large Hatch Ship *Omsk* Enroute to Haiphong from the Soviet Far East



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Figure 4. The Soviet Tanker *Molodechno* Discharging Its Cargo in the Haiphong Area

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
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1,100 tons in September. Exports from Hon Gay totaled 8,200 tons, compared with a monthly average of 10,500 tons during January-August 1967. Coal exports in September went to China (8,200 tons) and Japan (1,100 tons). Exports of miscellaneous and general cargoes also decreased to a record low volume. The cumulative effects of the bombing of North Vietnam on the export trade since the first quarter of 1965 are shown in Figure 5.

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Figure 5

### North Vietnam: Identified Exports Carried by Foreign Flag Ships By Quarter, 1965-67



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Table 1

North Vietnam: Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals  
 January-September 1967  
 and January-September 1966

Flag											1967		1966	
	1967										Jan-Sep		Jan-Sep	
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Number	Percent a/	Number	Percent a/	
Total	<u>37</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>302</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>280</u>	<u>100.0</u>	
<u>Communist countries</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>245</u>	<u>81.1</u>	<u>218</u>	<u>77.9</u>	
USSR	16	24	23	18	18	8	10	12	8	137	45.4	94	33.6	
Eastern Europe	4	3	4	4	2	4	2	1	2	26	8.6	28	10.0	
Albania	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.3	2	0.7	
Bulgaria	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1.3	4	1.4	
Poland	2	2	3	4	2	3	2	1	2	21	7.0	22	7.9	
Communist China	11	10	12	10	10	11	5	4	8	81	26.8	95	33.9	
Cuba	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.3	1	0.4	
<u>Free World</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>18.9</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>22.1</u>	
Cyprus	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	5	1.7	9	3.2	
Italy	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	0.7	1	0.4	
Malta	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	3	1.0	3	1.1	
United Kingdom	6	3	3	4	7	9	5	4	6	47	15.6	42	15.0	
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	2.5	

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

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Table 2

North Vietnam: Tonnages of Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals a/  
 August, September, January-September 1967  
 and January-September 1966

Type of Ship and Flag	1967						1966	
	Aug		Sep		Jan-Sep		Jan-Sep	
	Num- ber	Thousand Gross Register Tons	Num- ber	Thousand Gross Register Tons	Num- ber	Thousand Gross Register Tons	Num- ber	Thousand Gross Register Tons
Total	<u>23</u>	<u>137.9</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>138.2</u>	<u>302</u>	<u>1,502.2</u>	<u>280</u>	<u>1,642.8</u>
Dry cargo	20	120.7	24	134.9	270	1,366.8	260	1,519.4
Tanker	3	17.3	1	3.4	32	135.4	20	123.4
Communist countries	<u>17</u>	<u>104.4</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>99.5</u>	<u>245</u>	<u>1,223.0</u>	<u>218</u>	<u>1,290.7</u>
USSR	12	75.0	8	48.8	137	702.6	94	693.8
Eastern Europe	1	10.4	2	16.5	26	204.1	28	210.7
Communist China	4	19.0	8	34.2	81	306.8	95	376.5
Cuba	0	0	0	0	1	9.5	1	9.7
Free World	<u>6</u>	<u>33.5</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>38.7</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>279.2</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>352.1</u>

a. The aggregate tonnage of ships calling is not necessarily correlative to the actual volume of cargoes moving into and out of North Vietnam, but these data are of value as indicators of relative changes in the volume of shipping. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

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Table 3

North Vietnam: Identified Imports Carried  
by Foreign-Flag Ships a/  
September 1967

Thousand Metric Tons					
Flag	Commodity				Total
	Ammonium Sulfate and Other Fertilizers	Petroleum	Bulk Foodstuffs	Miscellaneous	
Total	<u>2.0</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>28.8</u>	<u>36.4</u>	<u>72.7</u>
Communist countries	<u>1.0</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>16.9</u>	<u>33.7</u>	<u>57.2</u>
USSR	1.0	5.5	6.5	8.8	21.8
Eastern Europe	0	0	0.2	10.4	10.6
Communist China <u>b/</u>	0	0	10.3	14.6	24.8
Free World	<u>1.0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>15.5</u>

a. Identified imports include some estimates of bulk cargoes,  25X1  
 Because of rounding, components may not 25X1  
 add to the totals shown.

b. An additional unknown quantity of imports may have been carried by Chinese Communist ships.

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Table 4

North Vietnam: Identified Exports Carried  
by Foreign-Flag Ships a/  
September 1967

Thousand Metric Tons			
Flag	Commodity		Total <u>b/</u>
	Coal	Miscellaneous	
Total	<u>9.3</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>10.6</u>
Communist countries	<u>9.3</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>10.6</u>
USSR	1.1	0.4	1.5
Eastern Europe	0	0	0
Communist China <u>c/</u>	8.2	1.0	9.1
Free World	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>

- a. Identified exports include some estimates of bulk cargoes,  Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
- b. No exports of apatite, cement, or pig iron were detected in September.
- c. An additional unknown quantity of exports may have been carried by Chinese Communist ships.

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